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Introduction 
Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment is probably the most influential bit of 
writing in western philosophical theorizing about well-being (Nozick 1974, 42). So it is 
unsurprising that there is no consensus as to what, if anything, the thought experiment shows. This 
shall not deter me, however, from stating what I take to be the central takeaway: on the experience 
machine, our mental states are disconnected from reality in a way that deprives them of (much of) 
the value they might otherwise have.1 Our beliefs are mostly false, our desires mostly unfulfilled, 
our satisfactions mostly illusory, our intentions mostly unsuccessful. Insofar as many of us think 
that our well-being is negatively affected by these facts, this suggests that prudential value depends 
often, if not always, on harmonious relationships between mind and world. This is the insight I 
will try to develop into a comprehensive theory of well-being I call harmonism. 
 The idea that harmony plays a central role in human values is not new. The Stoics thought 
that the end of life was to live “in agreement with nature.” (Long and Sedley 1987, 395) And 
philosophers thinking about intrinsic value since have often been tempted to give a prominent 
place to notions of harmony. Here is A.C. Ewing: 
If we are to say there is only one good, the most promising candidate 
                                               
1 Cf. Belshaw 2014, 580. 
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seems to me to be harmony. When we are in harmony on the feeling 
side with ourselves and our environment we have happiness; when we 
are in harmony on the intellectual side with reality, we have truth and 
wisdom; when in harmony with other men, social virtue and love 
(Ewing 1953, 73). 
Ewing immediately rejects the notion that harmony could be the only good, on the grounds that 
heroic struggle against difficulty appears to be a great good but not an instance of harmony (Ewing 
1953, 73). I disagree. A suitably developed notion of harmony can account for values, such as 
heroic struggle, that might not immediately jump out as harmonic.2 Nozick recognized this when, 
seven years after discussing the experience machine, he developed the idea that all value is organic 
unity (Nozick 1981, 429-32). I will briefly discuss Nozick’s account and how it relates to my 
project in the conclusion of this paper. 
In what follows, will develop a notion of harmony between mind and world that has three 
aspects. First there is correspondence between mind and world in the sense that events in the world 
match the content of our mental states. Second there is positive orientation towards the world, 
meaning that we have pro-attitudes towards the world we find ourselves in. Third there is fitting 
response to the world. Taken together these three aspects make up an ideal of being attuned to, or 
at home in, the world. Such harmony between mind and world constitutes well-being. Its opposite 
– being disoriented, ill-at-ease in, or hostile to the world – makes a life go poorly. And, as we shall 
see, many of the things that intuitively contribute to well-being are instantiating one or more of 
                                               
2 Cf. the Stoic contention that sometimes even a choice like ending one’s own life can be 
according to nature (Baltzly 2019, section 5).  
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the three aspects of harmony. 
 Before I begin, let me make a quick note on terminology. I will frequently speak of valuable 
events. The second part of this locution indicates that I take events to be the bearers of value. This 
is somewhat controversial, but not terribly so.3 The notion of events that I employ is Jaegwon 
Kim’s according to which events are exemplifications of properties and can be denoted as [x, P, t] 
with x, P, and t standing in for the event’s constitutive individual(s), property, and time interval 
respectively (Kim 1976, 159).4 Insofar as pleasure has value, for example, this means that the 
bearers of said value are events of the form [x, experiences pleasure, t], or [x, is pleased, t]. Unless 
otherwise noted, the value I refer to is final prudential value. And, for the purposes of this paper, 
to say that an event has final prudential value for someone is equivalent to saying that the event 
directly (rather than instrumentally) contributes to their well-being, or makes their life go better 
for them (Sumner 1996, 20-1). 
 
1. What Kind of Theory is Harmonism? 
Philosophical theories of well-being are commonly judged on two broad criteria. On the one hand, 
a theory should cohere with our considered intuitive judgements regarding what a life looks like 
that is good for the person who lives it. On the other, the theory should have some explanatory 
power. The former criterion is invoked, for example, when hedonism is rejected by reference to 
cases, like the experience machine, showing the possibility of a life that, despite being full of 
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pleasure, does not seem particularly good for the person living it. The second criterion is invoked 
when objective-list theories are charged with being no theory at all since they only state the 
(supposed) constituents of well-being without offering any explanation of how the list is populated 
(Sumner 1996, 42-3). 
 Moral epistemology being what it is, it is difficult to reject the first criterion out of hand. 
Thus, well-being theorists typically try to show either that their views are compatible with common 
sense, or that there is good reason to think that common sense is mistaken in particular instances.5 
By contrast, some theorists reject the second criterion. For example, Guy Fletcher follows Roger 
Crisp in distinguishing between enumerative and explanatory theories of well-being, with the 
former providing a bare list of things that make life good, and the latter providing an explanation 
of how that list is generated. But, while Crisp insists that a theory should be both explanatory and 
enumerative (Crisp 2006a, 102-3), Fletcher is happy to simply treat those as different types of 
theories and provides a mere enumerative theory himself (Fletcher 2013, 219). 
 It is worth dwelling briefly on what makes a theory of well-being explanatory. Presumably, 
what is required is that for each event that has final prudential value, the theory can provide an 
answer to the question why. For example, according to desire-satisfactionism each valuable event 
is valuable because it is desired by the subject.6 But note that typical objective-list theories meet 
this requirement also. That is because such theories do not list individual events but broad classes 
of events, such as ‘pleasure’ or ‘knowledge’. Thus, according to such theories, individual events 
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are valuable, because they are instantiating one of those categories.7 There are, of course, 
differences between those types of explanations. Desire-satisfactionism provides a causal 
explanation. It tells us what happened in the world that made it such that an event acquired 
prudential value (the subject desired it). The objective-list theory has no such story. Since a given 
event will always either be or not be an instance of pleasure, there is nothing that would cause the 
event to have (or not have) value. (This, of course, is not to deny that something will have caused 
the event to obtain.) However, we should not demand that theories of well-being provide causal 
explanations, for doing so would prejudge heavy metaethical questions. It might turn out, after all, 
that events are never caused to be valuable by some other event, but that whether an event has 
value is a matter of metaphysical necessity. In that case, the best we could do, in terms of 
explanation, is to identify the types of events that have such value.  
Thus, any dissatisfaction with the explanatory power of objective-list theories should not 
lie in the lack of a causal explanation. And it usually does not. This is evident from the fact that 
perfectionism is widely considered an explanatory theory.8 According to perfectionism, an event 
is good for a person, if and only if it instantiates the full development or exercise of an essential 
human capacity.9 This provides no more a causal explanation than an objective-list theory. The 
latter’s explanation for why a given event is valuable might be: because it is an instance of 
knowledge. Perfectionism would add: and knowledge is an instance of exercising an essential 
human capacity. This is a further explanation, to be sure, but not a qualitatively different one. Since 
                                               
7 Cf. Rice (2013), 200. 
8 Sumner 1996, 70; Crisp 2006a, 102; Fletcher 2013, 219. 
9 Hurka 1993; Dorsey 2010; Bradford 2015. 
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this is so, we could simply restate perfectionism as an objective-list theory populated with one 
item (perfection – however, that is spelled out in detail).10 But if this forces us to say that 
perfectionism is a merely enumerative theory, it seems we have lost valuable nuance.  
The difference between a stereotypical objective-list theory and perfectionism lies not in 
the type of explanation provided. Both theories explain the value of individual events by 
identifying them as instantiations of a class of events whose members are valuable. The difference 
is that the standard objective-list theory allows multiple such classes, while perfectionism only 
allows one. Or, rather, perfectionism purports that all the classes allowed by the correct objective-
list theory are subclasses of the one class it allows. It may appear, then, that the distinction between 
enumerative and explanatory theories is really the distinction between pluralism and monism. But 
if this were so, demanding theories to be explanatory would amount to ruling out pluralist theories 
by fiat.  
At this point, it is not easy to see how the distinction between enumerative and explanatory 
theories of well-being can be drawn such that insisting on explanatory theories can be justified (cf 
Lin, 2017). If we demand that explanatory theories provide a causal explanation, we prejudge the 
metaethical question whether value is caused. If we demand that explanatory theories show all 
prudentially valuable events to belong to a single class of events, we beg the question against the 
pluralist. Thus, I suggest that the distinction between enumerative and explanatory theories is less 
important than we might have thought. What can be rescued from the rubble are two thoughts. 
First, if there are causal explanations of value to be had, we should seek them. Second, other things 
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equal, it is preferable to account for all valuable events with fewer basic classes of valuable events 
than with more. But there is no magic in the number one here. A theory with two or three basic 
classes of valuable events might just be the best we can do while accounting for the facts.11 
With these preliminaries on the table, let me state what kind of theory I am proposing in 
this paper. Harmonism does not adduce causal explanations in the way that desire-satisfactionism 
does. Nor is it a monistic theory like perfectionism. It goes beyond a stereotypical objective-list 
theory, however, by providing three fundamental axiological principles that explain the objective 
list, in the sense that events instantiating the items on the objective list also instantiate one or more 
of those principles. Further, while not reducible to each other, the three principles can be 
understood as different aspects of a coherent ethical ideal of harmony. Thus, the theory combines 
the extensional adequacy of an objective list theory with greater theoretical unity than such theories 
can offer. 
 
2. An Objective-List to Start With 
Since I claim to provide a theory that provides a somewhat unifying explanation of the items on 
the objective-list, I need to start by providing such a list. Here it goes: achievement, knowledge, 
life-satisfaction, love/friendship, pleasure, self-respect, moral virtue. This list contains items that 
have been more or less widely embraced as bearers of final value in the western philosophical 
tradition.12 The items I included are ones that I believe to have final prudential value. However, 
this list is no more than a starting point. I will revisit it towards the end of the paper but, ultimately, 
                                               
11 Cf Hurka 2004, 252. 
12 Cf. Chisholm 2013, 22; Fletcher 2013, 214. 
 8 
the shape of the list is always going to be somewhat arbitrary. If my theory is correct, the items on 
the list are valuable in virtue of instantiating one or more of my three axiological principles. Those 
three, then, are the basic list. Once we extrapolate from this basic list to generate a list that uses 
common-sense terminology, there is no principled way of determining how fine-grained the 
categories we use should be. Once we recognize, for example, that both knowledge and 
achievement are valuable in virtue of instantiating the non-accidental correspondence principle, 
putting each of them on the list as individual items is no less arbitrary than separately putting on 
physical and intellectual achievement.  
 
3. The Principles of Harmonism 
I said that harmony has three aspects: correspondence, positive orientation, and fitting response. It 
is now time to elaborate on each of them. 
 
3.1 Correspondence 
Discussing the experience machine, Christopher Belshaw suggests that conformity between reality 
and the way we represent it is valuable (Belshaw 2014, 580). Similarly, Hurka argues that there 
are forms of correspondence between mind and world that are intrinsically valuable.13 This is a 
natural way of thinking about being connected with the world. Following Hurka, I operationalize 
the notion of correspondence as follows: (one valuable way of) being in touch with reality obtains 
when the intentional content of a mental state corresponds to what is actually the case (Hurka 2011, 
76). This claim needs to be qualified. First, it cannot be true of all intentional mental states. 
                                               
13 Hurka 1993, chapters 8-9; Hurka 2011, chapters 4-5. 
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Consider the case of disbelief. To disbelieve a proposition is to have an intentional mental state, 
but if the content of this disbelief actually corresponds to reality, the person is not thereby in touch 
with reality (au contraire). Similar considerations apply to other kinds of intentional mental states, 
such as imagining something, or being anxious about something. What these examples show is 
that only some of our intentional mental states are, as it were, aimed at correspondence with the 
world. We may say that such mental states have success conditions that are fully determined by 
their intentional content.14 And it is only those mental states that put us in touch with the world 
through such correspondence.15 Second, mere correspondence does not constitute enough of a 
connection between mind and world to make claims about harmony or value plausible. If the 
correspondence was simply an entirely accidental isomorphism, it would be a stretch to call this a 
harmonious relationship. We can imagine, for example, someone whose hunches are, due to sheer 
chance, always right (an unlikely but not impossible scenario); while such a person's mind would 
be corresponding to, it would not be in harmony with, the world. 
In order for correspondence to be a form of harmony, it must be no mere accident. What 
exactly this non-accidentality requirement comes to may differ from case to case. For purposes of 
illustration, think of Leibnizian monads. While never interacting, the correspondence between 
individual monads is nonetheless not a coincidence, but rather the result of God's plan. Thus, it 
                                               
14 Cf. Searle 1983, 10-1. 
15 Cf. Keller 2009, 668. 
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makes sense to speak, as Leibniz does, of harmony in this case.16 The current suggestion, then, is 
that non-accidental correspondence between a subject’s mind and the world contributes to the 
subject’s well-being. We can capture this idea as follows: 
The Non-Accidental Correspondence Principle (NACP): Events of the 
form [x, having an intentional mental state the success conditions of 
which are (a) given by its intentional content and (b) non-accidentally 
satisfied, t] are bearers of final prudential value for x. 
I take NACP to be a plausible rendering of the idea that being in touch with reality is an important 
part of a good life. NACP’s appeal is further strengthened by the fact that it explains two of the 
items on the objective list: knowledge and achievement. 
 While there is considerable disagreement about how to conceptualize knowledge, it seems 
clear that instances of knowledge are events of the type described by NACP. Knowledge involves 
belief which is the kind of mental state that is aimed at correspondence with reality.17 And if this 
correspondence obtains in a non-accidental way (what this comes to exactly is a much-discussed 
problem in epistemology), our beliefs constitute knowledge. Thus, if NACP is true, all instances 
of knowledge are intrinsically valuable. Similarly, while there is no agreement on the details of the 
                                               
16 I would say, however, that the locution pre-established harmony is misleading insofar as it 
obscures the fact that the pre-establishment on God’s part is a necessary condition for there to be 
harmony at all rather than mere correspondence. 
17 This is not to endorse a correspondence theory of truth. Rather, it is to endorse the truism that 
truth is objective, i.e. that true beliefs “portray the world as it is.” Lynch 2004, 12. Any theory 
of truth (and of knowledge) will have to capture that thought. 
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best analysis of achievement, the general contours are enough to see that achievements instantiate 
NACP. Achievements are events where an agent successfully fits the world to their goals or 
intentions.18 In order for such success to count as genuine achievement, this will have to be done 
competently, ruling out mere accidental correspondence.19 Achievements and knowledge, then, are 
structurally analogous events. We can think of them as mirror images of each other. The main 
difference between them lies in the direction of fit between mind and world. There are sure to be 
further differences when we get into the details, for example, of what is required for non-
accidentality in each case. But it is their shared structure that accounts for their value. They each 
instantiate NACP which is plausible in its own right, and NACP receives further support from the 
fact that it explains how knowledge and achievement each earn a place on the objective list. 
 
3.2 Positive Orientation 
NACP sees value in our mental states corresponding to events in the world, when this is no fleeting 
accident. A true belief based on no evidence, or a goal reached by pure luck do not instantiate the 
value of one’s mental life being securely tethered to reality which is what NACP is meant to 
capture. However, with some of our mental states, correspondence to the world is valuable, even 
if accidental. A fulfilled hope or desire can make my life better, no matter how accidental the match 
may be. I suggest that we can drop the non-accidentality condition for those of our mental states 
that combine accurate representation of an event with a positive orientation towards it. Such 
                                               
18 Keller 2004, 34; Hurka 2011, 97; Bradford 2015, 25; Navarro 2015, 3343; von Kriegstein 
2019, 404. 
19 Keller 2004, 33-4; Bradford 2015, 20; von Kriegstein 2019, 394. 
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affirming mental states are commonly called pro-attitudes. I propose to capture this thought in the 
following principle: 
The Positive Orientation Principle (POP): Events of the form [x, having 
a pro-attitude towards an obtaining event, t] are bearers of final 
prudential value for x. 
The insight captured by POP is that our lives go better for us, when we are content with the events 
that make up the world around us. Conversely, finding that the world is in a state we disapprove 
of, or find hostile, makes our lives go worse. This much is widely accepted. In fact, many theorists 
subscribe to the resonance constraint according to which nothing could ever enhance a subject’s 
well-being unless it involved the subject’s pro-attitudes.20 That said, few would be inclined to 
accept POP as stated. Those who accept that satisfied pro-attitudes contribute to our well-being 
typically subscribe to theories of well-being that are much more restrictive than POP. 
 The most widely discussed pro-attitude-based theories of well-being are desire-satisfaction 
theories and versions of hedonism that employ an attitudinal analysis of pleasure. The literature 
on those theories contains plenty of cases appearing to show that a principle like POP is too liberal. 
First, consider the scope problem (Darwall 2004, 29-31).21 This concerns pro-attitudes towards 
events that are so removed from our own lives that it seems implausible that their satisfaction 
would make a difference to our well-being. Derek Parfit illustrates this with his desire that a 
stranger he only met once will recover from an illness (Parfit 1984, 494). The stranger’s recovery 
would satisfy Parfit’s desire, but it does not seem that Parfit’s well-being is thereby enhanced. 
                                               
20 Railton 1986, 9; Rosati 1996, 300. 
21 Cf. Griffin 1986, 17. 
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Second, any connection between our pro-attitudes and our well-being may appear to be severed, 
if a pro-attitude is, in one way or another, defective. The most salient examples are cases where 
our pro-attitudes rest on false information, and cases where the pro-attitudes are formed 
inauthentically. Third, there is the problem of pro-attitudes towards events that themselves have 
negative value. Suppose, for example, that someone is taking pleasure in the suffering of others, 
or desires the annihilation of an ethnic group. Many think that the satisfaction of such pro-attitudes 
has no positive value.22 I take those three types of consideration to represent the strongest reasons 
for restricting POP. If any of them succeeds, we should modify POP. This would not threaten the 
overall architecture of harmonism, as it could incorporate a modified version of POP. But I think 
harmonism should incorporate POP as stated, and will indicate my reasons for this briefly. (While 
I am under no illusion that the following remarks will be fully convincing, this is not the place to 
relitigate at further length the debates around restrictions to pro-attitude-based theories of well-
being.) 
 Let me begin with three preliminary observations. First, the term ‘pro-attitude’ captures a 
wide range of attitudes such as being happy about, craving, desiring, judging to be good, taking 
pleasure in, wanting, and wishing for. However, as I use the term in this paper, ‘pro-attitude’ does 
not refer to what Chris Heathwood has recently called ‘behavioral desires’, namely 
[…] a state defined by what it does; in this case: an intentional state that 
disposes the person in it to try to act in the ways that (according to the person’s 
beliefs) would make its content true. (Heathwood 2017, 12)23  
                                               
22 Aristotle 1984, book X.3; Broad 1930, 234; Feldman 2004, 39. 
23 Cf. Stalnaker 1984, 15. 
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One can have a behavioral desire for an event without a corresponding pro-attitude. I may act to 
bring about an event because I perceive it to be my duty, for example, even though I thoroughly 
wish that the event would not come about. While behavioral desires are typically accompanied by 
pro-attitudes, it is only the latter whose fulfillment contributes to our well-being according to POP. 
Second, it is important to keep in mind that we are discussing POP as one of three axiological 
principles that make up harmonism, rather than as a stand-alone theory of well-being. This gives 
us additional resources to deflect objections. Most obviously, any claim that there are goods not 
captured by POP would be no objection, since POP is not supposed to cover all that is valuable. 
More subtly, some events, though valuable according to POP, may not be valuable overall, since 
they directly negate either of the other principles.24 Third, while POP allows all satisfied pro-
attitudes to be valuable, it says nothing about how much value each satisfied pro-attitude has. This 
should not be taken to imply that POP commits us to the implausible view that all satisfied pro-
attitudes have equal value. Let us now turn to the considerations mentioned above. 
The scope problem seems to show that we need to rein in POP and distinguish between 
well-being-relevant and well-being-irrelevant pro-attitudes. There are three types of suggestions 
for how to do this. Some authors single out particular psychological kinds of pro-attitudes,25 some 
restrict the range of events that can be the object of well-being-relevant pro-attitudes,26 and some 
                                               
24 I cannot discuss ill-being in this paper. I hope that the extrapolations I make when needed are 
uncontroversial. For more discussion of the negative analogue to well-being see Kagan 2015; 
Mathison 2018. 
25 Feldman 2004, 64-5; Dorsey 2012, 415. 
26 Overvold 1980, 117-8; Bykvist 2002, 480. 
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focus on the grounds on which a pro-attitude is held (Sumner 1996, 134). So far, none of these 
three paths has resulted in a satisfactory solution (von Kriegstein 2018, 424). Elsewhere, I argue 
that the way forward is to turn our attention to the question of how to measure how much a given 
satisfied pro-attitude contributes to our well-being. The answer to this question will be a scale 
assigning a weight to each pro-attitude. Well-being-irrelevant pro-attitudes are simply those whose 
assigned weight is zero. Beyond that there is nothing special about them that would require 
restricting POP to rule them out (von Kriegstein 2018, 425). I suggest a bifurcated scale for 
measuring the impact of satisfied pro-attitudes. For pro-attitudes accompanied by the belief that 
the favoured event already obtains, the contribution to well-being is measured by the pro-attitude’s 
amount of hedonic tone. For pro-attitudes not accompanied by such a belief, the contribution to 
well-being is measured by how committed the subject is to bringing about the favoured event (von 
Kriegstein 2018, 426). Very roughly speaking, the idea is that enjoying an event we correctly 
believe to obtain contributes to well-being proportionally to how enjoyable it is, while events 
fulfilling wishes or desires contribute to well-being to the degree that we were willing to work for 
them to come true.  
The scope problem, then, is no reason to restrict POP. Any axiological principle telling us 
that events of a certain type are valuable will need to be further specified by an account of the 
features determining the amount of value a particular event will have. POP is no exception. At the 
margin, the amount might be 0, but in practice this will be rare. Genuine pro-attitudes will usually 
come with at least a small amount of hedonic tone or commitment. Thus, most pro-attitudes will 
be well-being-relevant, though many of them to a negligible degree. 
The case of misinformed pro-attitudes strikes me as relatively easy to dispose of. We do 
often have false beliefs about the objects of our pro-attitudes, in particular when those pro-attitudes 
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are prospective. I might, for example, have a desire to go to Greenland for what I imagine to be its 
lush vegetation. But cases like this are easily dealt with even within a theory of well-being that 
relies solely on prospective pro-attitudes. My desire to go to Greenland is not my only desire. I 
also desire to see lush beautiful plants on my vacation. On plausible views regarding the relative 
importance of satisfied and frustrated pro-attitudes, the frustration of the latter desire probably 
more than outweighs the value of the former. We might think, for example, that intrinsic desires 
are more important than instrumental ones. Insofar as I want to go to Greenland only to satisfy my 
further desire to see lush vegetation, the desire to visit Greenland is merely instrumental. 
Somewhat more troubling is the fact that humans are bad at affective forecasting. That is to say 
even a factually accurate representation of a future event, will often be accompanied by a mistaken 
belief about one’s emotional reaction to the event’s obtaining (Wilson and Gilbert 2003). Sports 
fans, for example, often overestimate how happy they will feel, when their team wins a title. 
However, not all pro-attitudes are prospective. Thus, POP’s assessment of how much your team 
winning a title affects your well-being will not be solely based on how much you desired the event 
beforehand, but also on how much you enjoy the event once it has occurred. In most cases, in fact, 
POP would assign very little value to the satisfied desire of a sports fan, because fans, knowing 
that they have no influence on the games, typically do not display commitment to bringing about 
their desired outcome. Thus, a victory’s contribution to a fan’s well-being is almost entirely a 
function of how much it is enjoyed. By contrast, the contribution to a player’s well-being is a 
function of both how much they enjoy the victory and of how hard they were willing to work for 
it. This seems exactly right. 
The context in which the problem of inauthentic pro-attitudes has received the most 
attention is in discussions regarding adaptive preferences. Those are pro-attitudes, formed under 
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oppressive conditions, towards events not usually thought to be conducive to the subject’s well-
being (Khader 2011, 42). We need to distinguish two types of scenarios here. On the one hand, a 
person may temporarily have inauthentic pro-attitudes because they are not, as it were, themselves. 
Perhaps they are drunk, or in the grips of a hypnotist, or a very powerful speaker. I think that such 
pro-attitudes are well-being-relevant. Being short-lived, however, they do not carry much 
prudential weight. On the other hand, someone may permanently alter the kinds of things they care 
about. This, of course, happens to everyone all the time, and is worrying only when it appears to 
involve self-destructive pro-attitudes, or when it happens under the undue influence of adverse 
circumstances or of others. In our context, we can bracket concerns about undue influences. The 
reason we should not brainwash people is that doing so violates their autonomy; the reason is not 
that doing so makes them necessarily worse-off. If someone’s personality is altered as a result of 
being brainwashed, the question of how well-off they are will have to start with their new 
personality traits not their old ones. We may mourn, in such cases, that the old person is “gone”, 
while acknowledging that the new person is doing quite well. We do, however, need to worry about 
pro-attitudes that do not track the well-being of the person as they are now. In the most severe 
cases, people may have pro-attitudes toward events that are by all appearances positively bad for 
them. Think of the desire of a battered spouse that their partner may return to them. Those types 
of cases, however, can be handled by resources internal to a pro-attitude-based model along the 
same lines as the cases of misinformation above. That is to say in such cases the satisfaction of the 
pro-attitude in question is likely to lead to a highly negative balance of frustration over satisfaction, 
and this explains why the person would be better-off with the pro-attitude frustrated. A subtler 
treatment is required for less severe cases. 
Amartya Sen’s discussion of adaptive preferences focuses on people responding to living 
 18 
under bad circumstances by adjusting their pro-attitudes (consciously or unconsciously) so as to 
be able to satisfy a good chunk of them even in adverse conditions. If well-being was only a matter 
of satisfied pro-attitudes the lives of such people would be going equally well as the lives of those 
living under much better circumstances whose pro-attitudes embody accordingly more expensive 
tastes. This, Sen suggests, is an unacceptable way of thinking about the hardships faced by those 
with adaptive preferences (Sen 1987, 45-6). I agree. However, POP is not a comprehensive theory 
of well-being. Within harmonism there are other ways of capturing that living in destitute 
circumstances tends to have negative effects on well-being. For example, being poor will often 
mean a lack of opportunity to accumulate the most valuable achievements one would otherwise be 
capable of. At the same time, POP does imply that there is one respect in which having adaptive 
preferences satisfied does make one’s life better. But this is as it should be. It is why adapting one’s 
pro-attitudes to one’s circumstances can be a prudent strategy. I am better-off enjoying my KIA 
than pining for a Ferrari I will never own. This point stands even in cases of real deprivation (as 
opposed to the frivolous example just given).27 
Lastly, there is the problem of pro-attitudes towards evil events. The intuition that we 
should not ascribe final value to, say, sadistic pleasure is widely held. As Fred Feldman points out, 
however, things change a bit when we focus on prudential value specifically. That is to say, while 
it seems very clear that sadistic pleasure is bad, it is not so clear that it is bad for the person whose 
pleasure it is (Feldman 2004, 39). If Don authentically desires the suffering of his neighbours, we 
                                               
27 Adapting one’s pro-attitudes is not necessarily a prudent strategy. Insofar as it might 
undermine one’s motivation to improve one’s circumstances it might keep one from improving 
one’s well-being more substantially than adapting one’s pro-attitudes does. 
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should certainly not condone this attitude. Nor should we make the neighbours suffer in order to 
fulfill Don’s desire. But neither of those is forced on us by admitting that the fulfillment of the 
desire would be good for Don. In addition, harmonism has resources to explain why sadistic 
pleasure and other inappropriate pro-attitudes are bad overall in prudential terms, even when we 
accept that they have value via POP. As Franz Brentano points out, we can say that pro-attitudes 
towards evil can be good as satisfied pro-attitudes, while also bad as inappropriate attitudes 
(Brentano 1889, 94-5). We will return to the latter claim shortly. 
A final observation needs to be made concerning cases in which subjects mistakenly 
believe that their pro-attitudes are satisfied. On the face of it, such ‘false pleasures’ are not valuable 
according to POP, since POP applies only to actually obtaining events. To some degree this is a 
happy result, as it avoids experience machine type objections. But the verdict that false pleasures 
have no value whatsoever may appear a bit harsh. It seems that a person who is happily deluded 
may be at least somewhat benefitted by their happy thoughts, even though they would clearly be 
better off if the objects of those thoughts would actually obtain. POP can deliver the result that 
false pleasures, while falling short of true ones, have some value. The assumption needed is that, 
when we have pro-attitudes towards events we believe to obtain, our pro-attitudes are directed not 
only at the event itself but also at our contemplation of it. If, for example, Sumantra takes pleasure 
upon hearing that his team won a big title, the object of his pro-attitude may be both his team’s 
win as well as his own thinking about his team’s win. If so, POP would say that he is better-off 
even if his team actually lost, since one of the objects of his pro-attitude does obtain. While I am 
unsure about the plausibility of this move, this uncertainty matches my pre-theoretical doubts 
about the value of false pleasures (von Kriegstein 2018, 436-7). 
I submit, then, that POP is a plausible rendering of the idea that life is better when we 
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approve of the state of the world around us. POP also offers an explanation of two entries on my 
provisional objective list: life-satisfaction and pleasure. The former should be obvious, since life-
satisfaction just consists of positive evaluative attitudes towards one’s own life (Haybron 2008, 
82). The case of pleasure is more delicate as it relies on accepting an account of the nature of 
pleasure according to which pleasure consists of a type of satisfied pro-attitude. Arguing for such 
a view would go beyond the scope of this article, so let me just say that I accept something close 
to the attitudinal analysis provided by Murat Aydede (Aydede 2014).28  
Many events instantiating POP are instances of life-satisfaction, pleasure, or both. But not 
all of them. Harking back to my discussion of the scope problem, pleasure and life-satisfaction 
both involve pro-attitudes towards events we believe to obtain. But POP also includes the 
satisfaction of pro-attitudes not accompanied by such a belief. Thus, we need to add the satisfaction 
of such pro-attitudes to the list. This strikes me as a plausible addition.29 Note also that, according 
to POP, many achievements have value beyond what is accounted for by NACP. Achievements 
involve the pursuit of a goal which implies a commitment on the part of the subject toward reaching 
it (von Kriegstein 2017, 32). Insofar as the goal is also the subject of a pro-attitude (as opposed to 
merely a behavioural desire), reaching it will be valuable both as an instance of NACP and as an 
instance of POP. This strikes me as exactly right. Many achievements combine the value of shaping 
the world in accordance with a plan (as captured by NACP), with the value of the world 
conforming to our standards (as per POP). Such achievements are better for the achiever than 
having a desire fulfilled randomly, or achieving something they do not really care about – though 
                                               
28 Cf. Heathwood 2007. 
29 Cf. Arneson 1999, 124; Keller 2009, 659. 
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each of those has some value also. 
 
3.3 Fitting Response 
Taken together, NACP and POP tell us that our lives go well when we approve of the way the 
world is represented in our minds, and reality conforms to that picture. According to a third 
principle of harmony, how well our lives are going also depends on whether we respond 
appropriately to the world. Here is one way of operationalizing this idea: 
The Fitting Response Principle (FRP): Events of the form [x, having a 
fitting attitude to an event, t] are bearers of final prudential value for x. 
FRP is compatible with, but does not presuppose, a fitting-attitude account of value à la Ewing (or, 
more recently, Scanlon).30 Whatever our views about the meaning of terms like ‘good’ or 
‘valuable’, it seems plausible that events to which those terms apply call for certain responses (e.g. 
love, admiration) and not others (e.g. scorn, hatred). FRP advances the further claim that fitting 
responses are themselves bearers of value. This is more controversial, but has been defended at 
length by philosophers such as Brentano, Nozick, Hurka, and Bradford.31 However, FRP is yet 
more controversial, as it claims not only that fitting attitudes are valuable, but that they are 
prudentially valuable. In other words, I expect few to take issue with the notion that we should 
love the good and disapprove of the bad, more to object to the idea that doing so is itself valuable, 
and even more to deny that the value in question is final prudential value. Suppose, for example, 
that Nigel enjoys contemplating the misery of starving children. Nigel is clearly morally lacking, 
                                               
30 Ewing 1939; Scanlon 1998. 
31 Brentano 1889; Nozick 1981; Hurka 2001; Bradford 2015. 
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but is this something that is bad for him? Nozick answers in the affirmative: 
The immoral person thinks he is getting away with something, he thinks his 
immoral behavior costs him nothing. But that is not true; he pays the cost of 
having a less valuable existence. He pays that penalty, though he doesn’t feel 
it or care about it. Not all penalties are felt. … Others who understand value 
will realize how he is worse off, even if he himself does not. (Nozick 1981, 
409-10) 
The objection that Nozick replies to in this passage, is that something a person cannot be motivated 
to care about cannot be something that benefits or harms them. This is a version of the 
aforementioned resonance constraint. It should come as no surprise by now that I reject this 
constraint. Harmonism is not a subjectivist theory of well-being in the sense that it makes a 
subject’s pro-attitudes a necessary component of any event with prudential value.32 Via POP it 
gives an important place to such events but, already via NACP, it also allows values, such as 
knowledge, that might leave a subject cold. 
 Setting aside objections to including any objectivist goods, it might still be objected that 
FRP confuses moral with prudential value. It is uncontroversial that appropriately responding to 
the normative valences of events constitutes a life of high moral worth. But this does not 
necessarily mean that such a life is good for the person living it. I readily admit as much. These 
are two different modes of evaluating a life. What I am suggesting is merely that having fitting 
attitudes is a partial constituent of well-being. Like Nozick, I am not trying to reduce all of morality 
                                               
32 A fortiori, it is not a subjectivist theory in the sense that would require every valuable event to 
be the content of a pro-attitude (Van Weelden 2019, 147-9). 
 23 
to self-interest. According to harmonism, it is ceteris paribus good for you, if your attitudes fit 
their objects. But other things are not always equal, and it almost certainly is sometimes in your 
own best interest not to have fitting attitudes. Being left cold by some normative considerations 
can free you up to pursue other values in your life. Sometimes you can gain more that way than 
what you lose. But this does not mean that you lose nothing. Somebody who can act unimpededly 
by moral qualms, for example, may hurt others while laughing all the way to the bank. Our main 
objection to this will be that it is wrong to hurt others. But we can acknowledge, at the same time, 
that the transgression also comes at some cost for the transgressor themselves. It seems to me that 
righteous indignation should always be mixed with some amount of pity.33 
 My discussion of FRP so far has focused on attitudes towards events that are morally good 
or bad. What is fitting to such events are pro-attitudes and their opposites respectively. Applying 
FRP to these types of attitudes allows us to give a plausible explanation of the notion that moral 
virtue belongs on the objective list of prudential goods. As Hurka has argued at length, loving good 
and hating evil seem to be central components, if not the entirety, of what virtue consists in 
(conversely, hating good and loving evil constitute vice) (Hurka 2001).  
What further consequences the FRP has depends on how widely the standard of fittingness 
applies. We may think, for example, that amusement is a fitting response to an event that is 
genuinely funny (we might even think that being the fitting object of amusement is constitutive of 
the property of being genuinely funny) (Wiggins 1987, 195). If so, being amused by something 
that is genuinely funny is valuable according to FRP. Another example, made famous by G.E. 
                                               
33 In cases of outrageous moral violations our indignation may, of course, quite rightfully 
overpower any such pity, however appropriate. 
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Moore’s discussion, concerns the beautiful. Moore argues “that the beautiful should be defined as 
that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself.” (Moore 1903, 201). He thinks that 
whether something is beautiful is an objective matter, that admiring contemplation is the fitting 
response to beauty, and that instances of truly beautiful things being contemplated admiringly are 
valuable. The last point is closely related to FRP (though Moore does not think about value in 
terms of prudential value). My inclination is to deny that there are objective standards of humor 
and beauty that determine whether our corresponding attitudes are fitting. I am less than fully 
confident in this assessment however and, as far as FRP is concerned, I am quite content to let the 
chips fall where they may. If it turns out that we can be right or wrong about what is funny or 
beautiful, then I think we should accept that our lives are going better for us when our attitudes 
conform to those standards. 
 It is worth noting that, unlike NACP and POP, FRP does not require the objects of our 
mental states to obtain. This reflects the fact that to be guided by the normative standards of the 
world around us includes having fitting attitudes towards events that do not obtain. Whether or not 
an event obtains does typically make a difference as to which type or intensity of attitude is fitting. 
The recovery of Parfit’s stranger, for example, is a fitting object of hope when it does not yet 
obtain, and of joy when it does.34 This observation leads quite naturally to the question of what 
happens when we are mistaken about what events obtain. Suppose I am pleased because I falsely 
believe that a friend has received a long-awaited promotion. Assuming that the attitude would be 
fitting, were my belief true, what are we to say about this case? The answer is that it depends on 
whether my false belief is justified based on my evidence. If it is, the attitude is fitting, otherwise 
                                               
34 Cf. Maguire 2018, 793. 
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it is not. The reason why FRP has to be understood in this evidence-relative way (rather than in a 
strictly objective way) is that FRP captures the sense in which it is good to let oneself be guided 
by the normative features of the world, and the world can provide guidance only via the way it 
presents itself to us (cf Sepielli 2009, 8). In cases where our attitudes rest on misleading evidence, 
the world is failing to guide us (rather than us failing to let ourselves be guided). This lack of 
guidance is bad, to be sure, but this is already captured by NACP. Thus, what determines the 
fittingness of an attitude toward an event are its normative features together with our evidence as 
to whether the event obtains. 
 
4. Revisiting the List 
Having introduced and elaborated on the three principles of harmony, it is time to revisit the 
objective list we started with. As you may recall it had seven entries: achievement, knowledge, 
life-satisfaction, love/friendship, pleasure, self-respect, moral virtue. I have argued that knowledge 
and achievement instantiate NACP; POP accounts for the value of life-satisfaction, pleasure, and 
some additional value of many achievements; and FRP captures the value of moral virtue. In 
addition, we have seen that accepting POP requires us to add the satisfaction of pro-attitudes we 
do not yet believe to be satisfied to the list. Depending on the views we take regarding the 
objectivity of, e.g. beauty and humor, FRP might require us to make further additions. If, for 
example, Moore was right that beauty is an objective property, we should accept his further claim 
that the appreciation of such beauty makes our lives go better. FRP also helps us to account for the 
value of what Ewing called heroic struggle against difficulties. What I have not yet discussed are 
the goods of love/friendship and self-respect. This is because those goods instantiate more than 
one of the principles of harmony. 
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Self-respect is a multifaceted concept. On the one hand, there is what is often referred to 
as recognition self-respect which requires that we recognize ourselves as having a certain status 
(whether it is as a person, or as a specific part of some social group), and see ourselves in a certain 
evaluative light because of that. This idea can be captured by FRP once we make the appropriate 
assumptions about what aspects of a person’s identity make affording respect fitting. Evaluative 
self-respect, which involves that we respect ourselves not just for what we are, but for how we 
behave can be accounted for by POP, since it involves our living up to our own standards, i.e. our 
actions by and large are events that we have pro-attitudes towards. We might also think that 
evaluative self-respect can be either appropriate or inappropriate depending on whether the 
standards an individual measures themselves against are acceptable. If this is right, FRP will help 
us to capture the thought that appropriate evaluative self-respect is better than the other kind.  
Interpersonal relationships like love and friendship have the potential to instantiate all three 
of the principles of harmony. An extensive analysis of love is out of the question here, but we can 
note that at its best it involves knowledge of another person, as well as earning (achieving) both 
their affection and their happiness. Friends and lovers often have and achieve shared goals. These 
goods are captured by NACP. They enjoy spending time with each other, hope that the other one 
feels the same, desire to be understood by the other, and wish that the other person will think of 
them well. In a good relationship, these pro-attitudes will be satisfied and POP captures their value. 
Finally, the best interpersonal relationships involve appreciating in the other person what makes 
them admirable in ways small and large. This can be captured by FRP. 
 
Conclusion 
In Philosophical Explanations, Robert Nozick claims that all value is organic unity, i.e. that events 
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are intrinsically valuable if and only if, and to the degree that, they display “unity in diversity” 
(Nozick 1981, 416). One way of conceiving of the current paper, is as the project of isolating the 
attractive core of this rather striking claim by (a) scaling down its scope from all value to human 
well-being, and (b) providing a more precise rendering of what counts as a unifying relationship. 
Nozick starts with the observation that what is considered valuable in the aesthetic realm 
tends to be what in some way or other unifies diverse elements such as physical materials, ideas, 
or form-elements (Nozick 1981, 415-6). He proceeds to touch on an impressive array of realms in 
which value vocabulary is used discussing the value of organisms, ecosystems, scientific theories, 
organizations, societies, systems of belief, and mystical experiences (Nozick 1981, 416-22). The 
value of all of these, he claims, is a function of their degree of organic unity, i.e. of how diverse 
the elements are that they unify and of how tightly they do so (Nozick 1981, 416). The project fails 
to deliver on this hugely ambitious scope because Nozick never clarifies what counts as a unifying 
relationship across all those realms. In the case of aesthetic value his discussion does not go beyond 
evocative examples, while his discussion of the value of pro- and con-attitudes (‘V-ing’ and ‘anti-
V-ing’ in his terminology) shifts back and forth between notions close to all three of the principles 
of harmony discussed in this paper.35 This prompts Hurka to complain that Nozick is “papering 
over” different unifying relations (Hurka 2001, 39). This is unfair to Nozick who never pretends 
that there is a single unifying relationship across all realms. His failing is rather that he tells us too 
little about what unifying relationships there are, and how exactly they are supposed to work. 
 This is where the project of this paper picks up. NACP, POP, and RFP are clearly distinct 
from each other; yet each of them specifies a way in which our minds can be related to the world 
                                               
35 See Nozick 1981, 427 for NACP; 432 for POP; 433 for FRP. 
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in a valuable way. I think of them as different species of the same genus. Nozick might say that 
each principle specifies a unifying relationship. I prefer a slightly different terminology, calling 
them principles of harmony. Naturally, much more could be said about how to fill out the details 
of these principles. Moreover, the acceptability of my claim that these principles can account for 
the items we find on a plausible objective list of prudential goods depends not only on how exactly 
we understand the principles but also on what is the best analysis of those goods themselves. In 
this article I was able to give only the most perfunctory account in this regard. A full development 
and defense of harmonism, then, is a project for (a lot of) future work. What I hope to have 
achieved here is to make the case that harmonism provides an attractive framework for thinking 
about well-being, and that the work of developing it more fully is therefore well worth taking on. 
Taken together, the principles of harmony I have proposed in this paper make up an ideal of being 
attuned to, at home in, or in harmony with the world. I find this an attractive ideal and hope that 
others will too. 
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